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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT,
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to grant a Motion To Suppress.
Factually, at the time of the police encounter, officers had no reasonable suspicion that
Mr. Young had outstanding warrants to conduct a warrants search, detaining him for that
period. Officers were going door to door looking for another individual, Albert Phillips.
Upon contact with Mr. Young, officers allegedly grabbed him at the doorway and asked
him to step outside for questioning. With their photo of Mr. Phillips in hand, they

immediately realized that Mr. Young was not the man they were looking.
Thereafter, the officers discovered an outstanding warrant and paced him
into custody. Because he had just awoke, Officer Bruno entered into Mr. Young's home
and retrieved a jacket and shoes. Later, officers allegedly discovered methamphetamine
in the jacket after he was searched by a deputy at the jail. The search incident to arrest
failed to produce any contraband. But during the ride over to the jail, Officer Bieber
warned Mr. Young to confess possessing drugs now or if discovered at the jail he would
face "smuggling contraband into a jail" charge. The threats appeared to be clairvoyance,
because Officer Bieber's search of Mr. Young was unremarkable.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3 (1953,
as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). John Young appeals the final
order and judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County
involving the denial of his motion to suppress. (R. at 68-69). Final judgment was
entered on July 14, 2003. (R. at 94-97) (Attachment "A").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES,
Whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to
suppress?
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
The standard of review in this matter has long since been established and
was reiterated by this Court:
'"Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law which we [also] review for
correctness."'
In re B.V.. 33 P.3d 1083 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); see also State v. Pena.
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
Utah State Const. Art. I, § 12.

Utah State Const. Art. I, § 8.

Utah State Const. Art. I, § 7.

Utah State Const. Art. I, § 24.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 reh. den.
404 U.S. 874, 92 S. Ct. 26, 30 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971).
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527,(1983)
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976).
State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
State v. South. 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995).
State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d
752(1972).
Wattenburgv. U.S.. 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953, as amended).

STATEMENTS OF THE CASE,
I. Nature of the Case:
This case arises from the arbitrary and unreasonable detention of Mr.
Young on a May afternoon day just to run a warrants check on him while they attempted
to locate a Mr. Albert Phillips who was wanted for questioning in connection to a police
investigation. The officers possessed photo. Mr. Young was not that man. When
dispatch completed its warrants check, the officers discovered that Mr. Young had an
outstanding warrant. He was immediately placed into custody barefoot.
Officers then entered into Mr. Young's home and retrieved shoes and a
jacket for Mr. Young because he had just awakened because he works at night. A search
of Mr. Young's person was conducted incident to arrest. While en route, Officer Bieber
repeatedly asked Mr. Young if he had contraband on his person. Mr. Young denied

possessing any drugs. While at the jail, another search by Deputy Englund, which
produced a container of methamphetamine. These discoveries were the fruits of the
poisonous tree and should have been suppressed by Judge Fuchs.
II. Course of the Proceedings:
On May 9, 2002, this criminal action commenced against Mr. Young and a
warrant for Mr. Young's arrest was issued. (R. at 1-6). On July 16, 2002, Mr. Young
appeared with counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, where he was informed of the charges. (R. at
25). On July 22, 2002, Mr. Oliver requested discovery. (R. at 26-31). The State of Utah
responded to the discovery request on August 1, 2002, which included police reports.
On September 3, 2002, the defendant waived the preliminary hearing. (R. at 39).
Subsequently, Defendant was arraigned on September 16, 2002. (R. at 40). Based upon
the police reports, the defendant filed a motion to suppress and supporting memorandum
on November 7, 2002. (R. at 45-57). (Attachment "B"). The State responded to the
motion to suppress on November 26, 2002. (R. at 58-67). (Attachment "C"). The trial
court conducted its hearing on the motion to suppress and denied the same on December
6, 2002. (R. at 68-69). (Attachment "D"). (See Transcript (R. at 104); Attachment "E").
Thereafter, a bench trial was conducted on June 6, 2003, where Judge Fuchs surprisingly
convicted the defendant of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony.
(R. at 79-80).l Mr. Young was sentenced and committed on July 14, 2003. (R. at 941

The conviction surprised counsel, because the judge barely denied the motion to
suppress. (T. at 62-65). Constitutional violations are what invokes the Exclusionary Rule.
5

97). (Attachment "A").
III. Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial court denied Mr. Young's motion to suppress on December 6,
2002. (R. at 68-69). A bench trial was conducted on June 6, 2003, where Mr. Young
was convicted. (R. at 79-80). Mr. Young was sentenced and committed on July 14,
2003. (R. at 94-97).
IV. Statements of Fact:
On or about May 3, 2002, at approximately 1600, Officers Ron Bruno and
Jay Bieber of the Salt Lake City Police Department, encountered Mr. Young while
looking for another individual, Albert Phillips, who was the subject of a police
investigation. (T. at 6, 32, 46, 49, 55). They were conducting "knock and talks" while
traveling door to door. (T. at 6).
The information officers relied upon in their investigation was simply an
address, name, photo and description. (T. at 18). More importantly, the officers did not
have any information concerning Mr. Young. However, clearly though, Mr. Young was
not the man they were looking for and Mr. Young was not the subject of Officers
Bieber's and Bruno's assigned task. (T. at 12-13, 18-19). Mr. Young was not known to
be a suspect, for any offense. (T. at 19, 23, 26-29).
The officers went to the address of 1636 South Pioneer Road, in Salt Lake
City, Utah looking for Mr. Phillips. (T. at 34). Mr. Young's residence was a motorhome

6

situated at that location-it was not the only one. (T. at 6). In deciding which door to
knock on first, Officer Bruno just picked one. (T. at 10-11). Upon answering Officer
Bruno's knock on Mr. Young's door, believing Mr. Young to be the subject of the
investigation, the officers grabbed Mr. Young's arm at the doorway and asked him to
exit for questioning.2 (T. at 22, 35, 41, 43, 50, 54). While on the porch, Mr. Young
apprized both officers that he was not Mr. Phillips. Cooperating with questioning, Mr.
Young gave the officers his name and date of birth. (T. at 13, 36).
Then without any probable cause, Officer Bieber ran Mr. Young's name
anyway discovering an outstanding warrant for Mr. Young. (T. at 14-15, 38). The bench
warrant was issued on April 5, 2002, by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick allegedly for
failing to follow probation on a prior case no. 972168300. Young was not aware of any
violation proceeding, however. (R. at 48 ^f 7).
Because of Mr. Young's outstanding warrant, Officer Bieber arrested Mr.
Young on the spot and barefoot. (T. at 15, 38-39). Mr. Young works at night so he was
asleep at the time officers knocked. (T. at 56-57). Having just awoke, Officer Bruno
volunteered to enter Mr. Young's home and retrieve shoes. He exited with shoes and a

2

There exists a huge debate concerning this fact. Officer Bruno only testified that
he asked Mr. Young to exit and he denies pulling him out-but he was never asked if he
grabbed his arm. (T. at 22, 35). Officer Bieber denies any recollection. (T. at 41,43). Only
the defendant was certain that he was (1) grabbed and (2) pulled from his motorhome, nearly
stumbling. (T. at 50, 54).
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jacket for Mr. Young.3 (T. at 22-23, 42, 50, 55).4 Officer Bieber then searched Mr.
Young and nothing was reportedly discovered on his person. (T. at 39, 52). Officer
Bieber then transported Mr. Young to the Adult Detention Complex for booking. (T. at
39-40). While en route, Officer Bieber asked Mr. Young repeatedly if he had any
controlled substances on his person. Mr. Young denied possessing any controlled
substances. (R. at 49 1f 10, 59 % 2).
However, while being booked, Deputy Englund searched Mr. Young for a
second time, and much to both of their surprise, the deputy claimed to discover a
cigarette pack on Mr. Young's person. (R. at 49 ^ 11, 59-60; T. at 39-40, 46-47). The
pack allegedly contained a small amount of a controlled substance therein,
methamphetamine. (R. at 49 ^f 11, 59-60; T. at 40, 47).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this matter Defendant claims he had his Fourth Amendment rights
violated when (1) officers grabbed his arm through his doorway at the time of
questioning leaving him to believe he was not free to leave; (2) when officers

'< Both officers only testified about retrieving shoes, because the jacket was the
subject of the motion to suppress, both officers were suspiciously forgetful.
4

Why would Mr. Young be wearing a jacket? Or, why would Officer Bruno
retrieve a jacket for Mr. Young being the afternoon of a May day? Either there was a search
of the jacket while in the motorhome, or the contents of the jacket were planted. If the
jacket was even his. (T. at 14).
8

unreasonably detained him so that Officer Bieber could conduct a warrants search; (3)
when Officer Bruno unlawfully seized a jacket for the purpose of setting Mr. Young up
for a "smuggling contraband into a jail charge;" and (4) when Officer Bieber conspired
with Officer Bruno to discover the contraband in the jail.

ARGUMENTS
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED,
I.

Preface to Motion To Suppress,
For his hearing, the defense presented the following questions to the court

for examination in an evidentiary hearing:
(A).

Where did the cigarette pack come from?

(B).

Why wasn't the cigarette pack discovered incident to Mr. Young's

arrest and Officer Bieber's frisk?
(C).

Was Mr. Young's detention on his property reasonable (without

probable cause and exigent circumstances)?
(D).

Was the second search by Deputy Englund (a warrantless search)

supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances in view of Mr. Young's arrest?
(E).

Is the search of the interior of the cigarette pack within Deputy

Englund's scope to search as an exception to the probable cause and exigent
circumstance requirement?

9

In preparation for the hearing, the defense requested as part of the
examination for an inclusion of, inter alia, the following items:
(A).

The warrant of Albert Phillips.

(B).

The warrant of Mr. Young.

(C).

The cigarette pack.

(D).

The jacket.

Point I. Mr. Young Was Seized By Officers Bruno and Bieber Without A Warrant;
and
Point II. Acts Against Him Were Done Without The Existence Of Probable Cause
Or Exigent Circumstances.

II.

Probable Cause, Generally.

Probable Cause as defined in Black's Law Dictionary:
Reasonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground
for belief in certain alleged facts. A set a probabilities grounded in the factual and
practical considerations which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent
persons and is more than mere suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence
required for conviction. An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable
inquiry (this is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper),
which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a
criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged, or, in a
civil case, that a cause of action existed.
Black's Law Dictionary Abridged 6th Ed. If 834 (1991).
This Court in State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) defined
Probable Cause as a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
10

found" (emphasis added) (Citing Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2332 (1983). South further stated, 'Thus in determining the existence of probable cause
we focus on the suspicious nature of the circumstances involved." The only suspicious
nature in this matter is the officer's conduct. (R. at 59-60; T. at 22-24; 39-41). Nothing
of Mr. Young's conduct was admittedly suspicious. (T. at 19, 26).

III.

The Trial Courts Level of Discretion,

The Appellate Courts continually compare reasonable suspicion and
probable cause in making their decisions. The level of scrutiny is equally applied for one
as the other. For instance, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Contrel stated that
"While the required level of [reasonable] suspicion is lower than the standard required
for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used
to determine if there are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts' to support reasonable
suspicion." State v. Contrel 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted)
(emphasis by the Court).
Comparatively, the Utah Supreme Court granted discretion to a trial court
equally when applying facts to the probable cause standard as when applying them to the
reasonable suspicion legal standard. The Court stated, in pertinent part:
This court has yet to consider which standard appellate courts should apply when
reviewing determinations of probable cause to continue a search in the absence of
consent. In State v. Pena. [869] P.2d [932] (Utah 1994), we articulated, at length,
the standard of review appropriate to reasonable-suspicion determinations.
li

Although the legal standards and consequences of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion are distinct, we believe that the standards for reviewing
them should be the same. As explained in Pena, we review the underlying
factual finding of the trial court for clear error. Idatn.4. We review the legal
conclusion of "probable cause" for correctness, and in so doing, we afford a
"measure of discretion" which parallels that in Pena to the trial court's legal
determination of whether the officers had probable cause to search . . . .
State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531 (Utah 1994). (emphasis added)

IV.

Applying the Probable Cause Standard and Exigent Circumstances.
A.
Generally.

Section 77-7-2 of the Utah Code addresses when an arrest (synonymous to seizure) may
be accomplished absent a warrant. The section states:
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any
peace officer, "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a
public offense, and there is reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense;
or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (2002).
As previously stated, the probable cause requirement is to rise to a level
upon appellate review that would not result in a close de novo review. Furthermore, the
trial court has little discretion on issues of probable cause. Defendant contends that this
matter is not a close call-the trial court clearly erred.
In this matter, the circumstances do not amount to the level wherein either
appellate court would uphold a determination on review that the arresting officers had
either probable cause or the exigent circumstances to detain the defendant while
conducting an arbitrary search for warrants, and to unreasonable search and seize a jacket
from his home on a May afternoon because it allegedly contained contraband.

B.

Probable Cause Requirement To Obtain A Search
Warrant

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be search, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Id
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is very similar, it states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
13

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.5
The Supreme Court of the United States pointed out the significance of the warrant
requirement, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment when it stated:
[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or a magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.' (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 454-455 1971).
Id. They have further reiterated the value of a neutral magistrate in the process of
searches and warrants associated therewith as they stated in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S.
213,236(1983):
The judicial warranty has a significant role to play in that it provides the detached
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against
improper searches than the hurries judgment of a law enforcement officer
'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' (citation
omitted)
Id. In this case a warrant was not sought by either Officer Bruno or Officer Bieber for
any conduct they believed-for Mr. Young was not the subject of their investigation.
Neither was a public offense being committed in the officers' presence-Mr. Young was
asleep, barefoot and not wearing any jacket at the time of arrest. The accidental
discovery of an outstanding warrant fails to justify the officers baseless detention of Mr.
Young while awaiting the result of a warrant search. The officers search and seizure of a
5

Even though the protections described are similar, the Utah Appellate Courts have
determined that Art. I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution affords greater protection to
individuals than does the U.S. Constitution. See, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990).
14

jacket allegedly from Mr. Young's home is not justified by his retrieval of shoes for Mr.
Young.
The Defendant contends that upon verification that Mr. Young was not the
man in their photo, Officers should not have detained Mr. Young. Neither the name nor
the photo matched Mr. Young and there were other residences on the property. Why
didn't the officers ask, "Have you seen this man?" The further detention of Mr. Young
on his property in order to run a computer check for warrants was an arbitrary abuse of
authority. Historically, the right guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment was "a right of
personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 576, reh den. 404 U.S. 874,
92 S. Ct. 26, 30 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971), and that definition emerges most consistently from
the varying interpretations by both federal and state courts: "The central purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by the government officials." South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S.
364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1010 (1976), (Powell J., concurring). See also
U.S. v. Dunn. 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982). "The considerations of privacy here
envisioned are not predicated upon a general constitutional 'right of privacy' but upon a
right to be free from certain kinds of governmental intrusions." Wattenburg v. U.S., 388
F.2d 853, 858, n. 6 (9th Cir. 1968). As the court in Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347,
88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582 (1967), the "trespass" doctrine once enunciated in

15

Olmstead v. United Stated. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) is no
longer be regarded as controlling. What re-emerges, consistent with Katz, is the maxim
of Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent which foreshadowed the precept that government
protects people, not places:
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the right
to be left alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id, 6
In this matter, from a review of the facts presented at the hearing, the
officers conduct against Mr. Young was suspicious in nature. The logical inferences is
that the officers set Mr. Young up for Deputy Englund's discovery of contraband upon
him. First of all, the facts surrounding the encounter were not focused on Mr. Young,
they were looking to talk with an Albert Phillips. Mr. Phillips wasn't even a suspect.
Secondly, the results of the two searches of Mr. Young are complete opposites. Why
would Officer Bieber not discover contraband, but Deputy Englund would? Its peculiar
that Officer Bieber would question Mr. Young in his police cruiser about contraband on
his person, and inform Mr. Young that if drugs were discovered on him at the jail, Mr.
Young would be charged with "smuggling contraband into a jail." (R. at 59-60).

« Quoted in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983).
16

C.

Questionable Facts Omitted Suggest A Concealment Of A
Violation Of The Fourth Amendment's Probable Cause
Requirement

As stated throughout, the defense raised questions of suspicion surrounding
the Officers' "encounter." Once it was discovered that the officers have contacted an
innocent man, the officers had no further business with Mr. Young at Mr. Young's home
and they should have left him alone. Officers Bieber and Bruno were looking for an
Albert Phillips-they only wanted to talk with Mr. Phillips. Once the officers discovered
Mr. Young was not their man, the should have immediately left the premises absent
evidence of wrongdoing by Mr. Young. In this case, the officers violated the chief evil
Utah law recognizes pertaining to the Fourth Amendment concerning peoples' private
residence. State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Beavers.
859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("This elevated burden is a result of the 'heightened
expectation of privacy' that citizens enjoy in their own homes"); see also United States v.
United States Dist. Court. 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752
(1972) (stating that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"). The jacket suspicious appears and is
discovered to have drugs contained in the pocket. Officer Bruno volunteered to enter
Mr. Young's home to retrieve shoes for Mr. Young. That voluntary offer appears to
have a suspicious ulterior motive to search apparel. Above the officers forgetfulness,
Officer Bruno likely retrieved the jacket for the purpose of discovering a crime by an
17

apparent happenstance. The questioning by Officer Bieber in his patrol car suggests
otherwise.

D,

Conflicting Search Results Suggest A Fourth
Amendment-Probable Cause Violation.

As noted herein, two searches of Mr. Young's person were conducted
incident to his arrest. The first search was conducted at Mr. Young's residence by
Officer Bieber. The second search was conducted by Deputy Englund at the jail during
processing. The results of the two searches were complete opposites. Bieber's search
allegedly failed to discovery anything at all suspicious, including cigarettes. Englund's
search allegedly yielded contraband in a cigarette pack. If Mr. Young was in possession
of a pack of cigarettes, why wasn't it confiscated at the scene? Prior to taking Mr.
Young to the jail, Officer Bieber appeared to demonstrate clairvoyance when he
encouraged Mr. Young to admit possessing drugs or run the risk of being charges for
"smuggling contraband into a jail" if a search at the jail discovered he had drugs on his
person. The defense contends that Officers Bruno and Bieber concealed the truth from
the judge.

E.

Suppression Of Evidence Is A Necessary.

On de novo review, the defense recalls for suppression of evidence
pursuant to the fruit-of the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Both the State of Utah and the
18

United States have embraced the doctrine. In State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, n.5 (Utah
1995), the Utah Supreme Court footnoted, 'The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, as
enunciated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct.
407 (1963), requires the exclusion at trial of evidence obtained through a violation of the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments.'' In this matter, it is clear from the facts articulated by both
Officers Bruno and Bieber that (1) the officers' detention at Mr. Young's home prior to
discovering of an outstanding warrant for him, and (2) the seizure of the jacket and
contraband were poisonous trees, and any information derived from them were the fruits
of those poisonous trees. Therefore, suppression in this matter would be appropriate.
Clearly officers had no reason to run a warrants check, and officers planted the
contraband upon Mr. Young's person when they retrieved his shoes and the jacket.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Young has been unjustly treated in this matter. Judge Fuchs clearly
stated that civil rights violations may have occurred. If he believed there was a civil
rights violation why then would he not conclude exclusion of the evidence to be
appropriate. The warrants search was not supported by reasonable suspicion and the
seizure of the jacket was unreasonable. If served the sole purpose of planting contraband
on his person for the jail to discover, because the discovery of contraband in the home,
not in plain view, would have been illegally seized.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of
March, 2004.

A?,

&Q^^_

D. BRUCE OLIVER

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 11th day of March, 2004,1
served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Office of the
Attorney General, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854.

D. BRUCE OLIVER

Exhibit "A"
Final Judgment

Third District Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
< 4 -A

S1^€_

Plaintiff
COMMITMENT
After Judgment
4 a k VA

/ cO ^ a

J
Case JVo. O Z

Address

^Oh^oH

/
Defendant

DOB

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021906404 FS

JOHN EDWARD YOUNG,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENNIS M. FUCHS
July 14, 2003

PRESENT
CIerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, LANA
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 23, 1964
Video
Tape Number:
VIDEO
Tape Count: 9:04
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/06/2003 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 021906404
Date:
Jul 14, 2003

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 3 65 The total time suspended for this
charge is 0 day(s).
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
NO CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$5000.00
$4225.00
$356.08
$775.00
$5000.00
$4225.00
$356.08
$775.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 3 65 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 775.00 which includes the surcharge,
Interest may increase the final amount due.
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Case No: 021906404
Date:
Jul 14, 2 0 03
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use- of alcoholic beverages.
Submit to a mental health evaluation.
Maintain full time employment and/or education.
COMPLETE CATS WHILE IN JAIL - court will consider an early release
upon completion.
Court will grant credit for time served upon a prepared order from
counsel.
Dated this

tM

day of

AO
DENNI

._ . .
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Exhibit "B"
Young's Motion To Suppress
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D.Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax:(801)595-0300

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,
Case No. 021906404 FS

vs.
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG,

Judge Randall N. Skanky
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant, John Edward Young, by and through counsel, D.
Bruce Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to suppress any and all evidence
obtained by the State, or its agents and other peace officers, in this matter for a warrant
violation / unauthorized search and seizure. The search and seizure of the Defendant in his
person, place and effects clearly exceeded authority due to no exigent circumstances, no
probable cause (mistaken identity), and for a violation of the fruits of the poisonous tree
doctrine.
This motion is filed pursuant to the Exclusionary Rule, for the officers'
violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The said
motion is further supported by the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities which

is annexed hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
In this matter, the defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of this case and the
said motion is in no way adverse to the public interest, and societal interests for protecting
individuals rights outweigh that of the government.
The defendant reserves the right to submit briefing on any issues after the court
conducts an evidentiary hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of
October, 2002.
^L

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: T. Langdon
Fisher, District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
Dated this 29th day of October, 2002.
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D.Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax:(801)595-0300

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.

}

Case No. 021906404 FS

JOHN EDWARD YOUNG,

)
)
)

Judge Randall N. Skanky

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Comes now the defendant. John Edward Young, by and through counsel, D.
Bruce Oliver, and submits this memorandum of points and authorities supporting his motion to
suppress evidence obtained in the disregard of Mr. Young's Fourth Amendment and State
Constitutional Rights to a warrant, probable cause, and the need for exigent circumstances.

Statements of Fact.

The following facts are based on the statements made within the Information, the
police reports and supplemental reports prepared by the officers involved which are filed with
this Court, officer omissions derived from defense interviews, and any logical inferences drawn
therefrom. These facts are for the purpose of demonstrating a legal theory and Mr. Young does

not concede to these facts or this factual scenario nor does he admit any guilt expressed or
implied.
1.

On or about May 3, 2002, at approximately 1600, Officer Bieber of the Salt Lake

City Police Department, encountered Mr. Young while looking for another individual whom had
an outstanding warrant.
2.

The ONLY information Officer Bieber relied upon was simply an address and a

name. Apparently he did not possession a physical description of the person or other
information. More importantly, he did not have any information concerning Mr. Young.
3.

Mr. Young was not the subject of Officer Bieber's assigned task.

4.

Officer Bieber went to the address of 1636 South Pioneer Road, in Salt Lake City.

Utah looking for that individual (whose name and whereabouts is unbiown or uncertain to the
defense).
5.

Upon answering Officer Bieber's knock on Mr. Young's door, believing Mr.

Young to be the subject of Bieber's warrant. Officer Bieber entered Mr. Young's doorway
pulling him out in order to arrest him.
6.

While on the porch. Mr. Young apprized Officer Bieber that he was not the

individual Bieber was attempting to arrest.
7.

Without any probable cause, Officer Bieber ran Mr. Young's name anyway

discovering an outstanding warrant for Mr. Young. The bench warrant was issued on April 5,
2002, by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick allegedly for failing to follow probation on case no.
972168300. Young was not aware of any violation proceeding.
8.

Because of Mr. Young's outstanding warrant, Officer Bieber arrested Mr. Young.
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9.

Officer Bieber searched Mr. Young and nothing was reportedly discovered on his

10.

Officer Bieber then transported Mr. Young to the Adult Detention Complex for

person.

booking. While en route, Officer Bieber asked Mr Young if he had any controlled substances on
his person. Mr. Young denied possessing any controlled substances.
11.

While being booked. Deputy Englund searched Mr. Young for a second time, and

much to both of their surprise, Englund claimed to discover a cigarette pack on Mr. Young's
person. The pack allegedly contained a small amount of a controlled substance therein.
12.

The defense presents the following questions to the court for examination in an

evidentiary hearing:
(A).

Where did the cigarette pack come from?

(B).

Why wasn't the cigarette pack discovered incident to Mr. Young's arrest?

(C).

Was Mr. Young's detention on his property reasonable (without probable

(D).

Was the second search (a warrantless search) supported by probable cause

cause)?

and exigent circumstances in view of Mr. Young's arrest?
(E).

Is the search of the interior of the cigarette pack within officer's scope to

search as an exception to the probable cause and exigent circumstance requirement?
13.

The defense requests the examination to include, inter alia, the following items:
(A).

The warrant of the unknown person.

(B).

The warrant of Mr. Young.

(C).

The cigarette pack.
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(D).

The jacket.

Arguments.
Point I. Mr. Young Was Seized By Officer Bieber Without A Warrant; and
Point II. Without The Existence Of Probable Cause Or Exigent Circumstances.

A.

Introduction.

Probable Cause as defined in Black's Law Dictionary:
Reasonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for belief
in certain alleged facts. A set a probabilities grounded in the factual and practical
considerations which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent persons and is more
than mere suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence required for conviction. An
apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry (this is, such inquiry as the
given case renders convenient and proper), which would induce a reasonably intelligent
and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the
crime charged, or, in a civil case, that a cause of action existed.
Black's Law Dictionary Abridged 6th Ed. 1j 834 (1991).
The Court of Appeals in State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
defined Probable Cause as a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found." (emphasis added) (Citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332
(1983). The South Court further stated, "Thus in determining the existence of probable cause we
focus on the suspicious nature of the circumstances involved."

B,

The Trial Court's Level of Discretion.

The Courts continually compare reasonable suspicion and probable cause in
making their decisions. The level of scrutiny is equally applied for one as the other. For
instance, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Contrel stated that "While the required level of

[reasonable] suspicion is lower than the standard required for probable cause to arrest, the same
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific
and articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis by the Court).
Comparatively, the Utah Supreme Court granted discretion to a trial court equally
when applying facts to the probable cause standard as when applying them to the reasonable
suspicion legal standard. The Court stated, in pertinent part:
This court has yet to consider which standard appellate courts should apply when
reviewing determinations of probable cause to continue a search in the absence of
consent. In State v. Pena, [869] P.2d [932] (Utah 1994), we articulated, at length, the
standard of review appropriate to reasonable-suspicion determinations. Although the
legal standards and consequences of probable cause and reasonable suspicion are
distinct, we believe that the standards for reviewing them should be the same. As
explained in Pena, we review the underlying factual finding of the trial court for clear
error. Id. at n.4. We review the legal conclusion of "probable cause" for correctness, and
in so doing, we afford a "measure of discretion" which parallels that in Pena to the trial
court's legal determination of whether the officers had probable cause to search. . . .
(emphasis added)
State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531 (Utah 1994).

C.

Applying the Probable Cause Standard and Exigent Circumstances.
I.
Generally.

Section 77-7-2 of the Utah Code addresses when an arrest (synonymous to seizure) may be
accomplished absent a warrant. The section states:
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace
officer, "presence includes all of the physical senses or any device that enhances
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the observations
of any of the physical senses:
c

(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public
offense, and there is reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public
offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953, as amended).
As previously stated, the probable cause requirement is to rise to a level upon
appellate review that would not result in a close de novo review. Furthermore, the trial court has
little discretion on issues of probable cause.
In this matter, the circumstances do not amount to the level wherein either
appellate court wrould uphold a determination on review that the arresting officer had either
probable cause or the exigent circumstances to seize the defendant and search his person.

II.

Probable Cause Requirement To Obtain A Search Warrant.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be search, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is very similar, it states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
6

be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.1
The Supreme Court of the United States pointed out the significance of the warrant requirement,
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment when it stated:
[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or a magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions'. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455
1971).
Id. They have further reiterated the value of a neutral magistrate in the process of searches and
warrants associated therewith as they stated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983):
The judicial warranty has a significant role to play in that it provides the detached
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper
searches than the hurries judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime' (citation omitted).
Id. In this case a warrant was not sought by Officer Bieber for any conduct he believed. Neither
was a public offense being committed in the officer's presence. The latter accidental discovery
of an outstanding warrant fails to justify Officer Biebefs former seizure and detention of Mr.
Young on his private property. Officer Bieber mistakenly seized Mr. Young, pulling him out of
his home. The officer's actions facilitated out of a mistaken identiJfy. While executing a warrant.
the officer endeavored to arrest Mr. Young on scanty facts, leading Officer Bieber to seize the
wrong man.
Upon discovery of the error. Officer Bieber should have released Mr. Young.
IMMEDIATELY! The further detention of Mr. Young on his property in order to run a

Even though the protections described are similar, the Utah Appellate Courts have
determined that Art. I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution affords greater protection to individuals
than does the U.S. Constitution. See, State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
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computer check for warrants was an arbitrary abuse of authority. Historically, the right
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment was "a right of personal security against arbitrary
intrusions by official power." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L.
Ed. 2d 564, 576, reh. den. 404 U.S. 874, 92 S. Ct. 26, 30 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971), and that
definition emerges most consistently from the varying interpretations by both federal and state
courts: 'The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by the government officials." South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1010 (1976), (Powell J., concurring). See also
U.S. v. Dunn, 61A F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982). wThe considerations of privacy here envisioned are
not predicated upon a general constitutional 'right of privacy* but upon a right to be free from
certain kinds of governmental intrusions." Wattenburg v. U.S., 388 F.2d 853, 858, n. 6 (9th Cir.
1968). As the court in Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582
(1967), the "trespass" doctrine once enunciated in Olmsteadv. United Stated. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.
Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) is no longer be regarded as controlling. What re-emerges,
consistent with Katz, is the maxim of Justice Brandeis5 Olmstead dissent which foreshadowed
the precept that government protects people, not places:
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the right to be left
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

Id?
In this matter, from a review of the facts presented in the police reports, there
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Quoted in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983)
e

appears to be some significant facts omitted from the reports that raise a brow of concern. First
of all, the facts surrounding the initial encounter are more than suspicious and are not supported
by the police reports. Secondly, the results of the two searches of Mr. Young are complete
opposites.

D.

Questionable Facts Omitted Suggest A Violation Of The Fourth
Amendment-Probable Cause Requirement.

As stated herein, the defense raises questions of concern regarding Officer
Bieber's "encounter/' Officer Bieber makes no mention as to his business with Mr. Young at
Mr. Young's home. After inquiry and investigation, the defense has discovered that Officer
Bieber was attempting to execute an arrest warrant on another person, whose name is unknown
to the defense at this time. Once Officer Bieber discovered Mr. Young was not his man, he
should have immediately left the premises absent evidence of wrongdoing by Mr. Young. The
officer violated the chief evil Utah law recognizes pertaining to the Fourth Amendment
concerning peoples' private residence. State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("This elevated burden is a result
of the 'heightened expectation of privacy' that citizens enjoy in their own homes"); see also
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d
752 (1972) (stating that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed").

E.

Conflicting Search Results Suggest A Fourth Amendment-Probable Cause
Violation.

As noted herein, two searches of Mr. Young's person was conduct incident to his
arrest. The first search was conducted at Mr. Young's residence by Officer Bieber. The second
search was conducted by Deputy Englund at the jail during processing. The results of the two
searches were complete opposites. Bieber*s search allegedly failed to discovery anything at all.
Englund* s search allegedly yielded contraband in a cigarette pack. If Mr. Young was in
possession of a pack of cigarettes, why wasn't it confiscated at the scene? In the car ride to the
jail, Officer Bieber appeared to demonstrate clairvoyance when he suggested that Mr. Young
admit possessing drugs or run the risk of being charges of additional charges if a search at the jail
discovered he was smuggling drugs into the facility. The defense contends that either Officer
Bieber is purposefully concealing facts or he is creating those facts for reasons only known to
him.

G.

Suppression Of Evidence Is A Necessary.

In this matter, the defense calls for suppression of evidence pursuant to the fruitof-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Both the State of Utah and the United States have embraced the
doctrine. In State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182. n.5 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court footnoted,
"The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, as enunciated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963), requires the exclusion at trial of evidence
obtained through a violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments." In this matter, it is clear from
the facts articulated in Officer Bieber's report that the officer's detention at Mr. Young's home
prior to discovering of an outstanding warrant for him was the poisonous tree, and any
information derived from that detention was the fruit of that poisonous tree. Therefore

suppression in this matter would be appropriate.

Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests that this Court
suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal detention and unjustified warrants check of the
Defendant without any belief of wrongdoing by defendant while at Defendant's home.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of
October, 2002.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: T. Langdon Fisher. District Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City. Utah 84111.
Dated this ,_29th day of October. 2002.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 021906404 FS
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG,
Judge Randall N. Skanchy
Defendant.

The State of Utah, through its counsel, DAVID E. YOCOM, Salt Lake County
District Attorney and LANA TAYLOR, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits this
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and respectfully requests
this Court deny the Defendant's Motion.

V
FACTS1
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On May 3, 2002, at 1636 South Pioneer Road, Salt Lake County, Officer Ron
Bruno (hereinafter "Officer Bruno") of the Salt Lake City Police Department was
conducting a follow up investigation regarding a car theft in the immediate area. Officer
Bruno was looking for car theft suspect, Albert Franklin Philips (hereinafter "Albert
Philips"), a wanted person with outstanding warrants for his arrest. Based upon the car

^

theft investigation, it was determined that Albert Philips was living in a motor home
located in the rear of several car repair businesses. Officer Bruno also received
information that Albert Philips was residing at that address with another individual that
was also involved in the car theft.
Before approaching the motor home, Officer Jay Bieber (hereinafter "Officer
Bieber") was called to assist in the investigation. Upon Officer Bieber's arrival, both
Officer Bruno and Bieber knocked on the door of one of two motor homes parked behind
the car repair businesses. At the first motor home, the defendant answered the door. The
defendant stepped out of the motor home and spoke with both officers. Officer Bruno
then asked the defendant for his name and date of birth to verify who he was. The
defendant complied and provided the requested information. Officer Bieber ran the
defendant's name and birthdate through with dispatch and discovered that the defendant
had, among several other warrants statewide, a warrant out of Salt Lake City for his
arrest. The defendant was then placed under arrest and handcuffed. However, before
being placed in Officer Bieber's police car, Officer Bieber conducted a Terry frisk of the
defendant for weapons.
During the protective search, Officer Bieber explained to the defendant that if he
possessed any controlled substances on his person he would need to tell him now or
otherwise he would be charged with smuggling contraband when he entered the jail.
Defendant stated that he possessed no controlled substances on his person. Nothing was
discovered during the protective frisk. Defendant was then transported to the Adult
Detention Center in Salt Lake County where, during an administrative intake search,

Facts are provided from police reports and telephone interviews with both Officer Ron Bruno and Officer
Jay Bieber of the Salt Lake City Police Department
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Deputy J. Englund (hereinafter "Deputy Englund") found a baggy of methamphetamine
in the bottom of a cigarette container in the defendant's pocket. Defendant was charged
with one count of possession of a controlled substance.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT
BECAUSE THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND THE
OFFICERS WAS A LEVEL ONE ENCOUNTER.
The defendant was not seized without a warrant because the encounter between

the defendant and the officers was a level one encounter. Police officers "may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes
of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 8 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906907 (1968). There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters
between law enforcement officers and the public:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an 'artibulable suspicion' that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must
be temporary and last no longer that is necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
Salt Lake City v. Ray. 2000 UT App 55 f 10, 998 P.2d 274, 277 (citing State v. Deitman,
739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(per curiam)) (citations omitted ).
A level one encounter "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to
an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." Ray, 2000 UT App at Tf 11, 998
P.2d at 277 (citing State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The Utah
Court Appeals has held that a request for identification alone "as a matter of
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law,.. .cannot constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter
into a seizure.'" Ray, 2000 UT App. at If 12, 998 P.2d at 278 (citing Jackson, 805 P.2d at
768). Furthermore,
[e]xamples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request-might be
compelled.
Ray, 2000 UT App at % 11, 998 P.2d at 277 (citing State v. Patefield 927 P.2d
655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(quoting United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S.
544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)).
In this case, encounter between the defendant and Officers Bruno and Bieber was
a level one encounter. Both officers were merely following up on a car theft
investigation and information that Albert Philips was the suspect in that case. Officer
Bruno had also discovered that another individual who resided with Albert was involved
in the car theft. After the defendant stepped out of the motor home and agreed to speak
with the officers, Officer Bieber had the right to request the defendant's name and date of
birth for identification purposes. Furthermore, based upon the information possessed by
the officers, Officer Bieber also had the right to run a warrants check on the defendant.
See Ray, 2000 UT App at If 13 n.2, 998 P.2d at 278 ("A w arrant check will not per se
escalate the encounter into a level two stop."). Under the circumstances of this case, the
encounter between the defendant and the officers was merely a level one encounter.
There is no evidence that the officers threatened the defendant in any to exit the motor
home or that they displayed any physical force upon the defendant to cooperate with in
their investigation. The defendant was compliant and voluntarily provided his name and
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date of birth to the officers. Therefore, because the actions of Officer Bieber did not arise
to a warrantless seizure of the defendant, the defendant's motion should be denied.
II.

EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN
THE DEFENDANT AND THE OFFICERS WAS A LEVEL TWO STOP,
THE OFFICERS HAD REASONABLE SUSPICTION JUSTIFYING THE
BRIEF DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THEY HAD
RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INVOLVED
IN THE CAR THEFT.
Even if the court finds that the encounter between the defendant and the officer

was a level two stop, the officers had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief detention
of the defendant because they had reliable information that the defendant was involved in
the car theft investigation. It is well settled that a police officer may detain and question
an individual "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has
been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,
450 (Utah 1995).
The courts have recognized that for an officer to make a non-consensual
investigative stop, the officer must "be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 21, 8 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906
(1968). Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon the content of
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. State v. Humphrey, 937
P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).
In applying these principles to the facts of this case, the court should find that the
defendant was not unreasonably detained by Officers Bruno and Bieber. Officer Bruno
had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief detention of the defendant to make an
investigative inquiry regarding his involvement in the car theft. During his investigation,
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Officer Bruno received information that the main suspect in that case, Albert Philips, was
living in a motor home in the rear of several car repair businesses. In addition, Officer
Bruno received information that another individual involved in the car theft resided with
Albert Philips in the motor home. In conducting a follow up investigation, both Officer
Bruno and Bieber knocked on the motor home door and spoke with the defendant. The
defendant voluntarily stepped out of the motor home and provided the officers with his
name and date of birth. Officer Bieber's investigative inquiry regarding the identity of
the defendant was the quickest and least intrusive means to investigate whether or not he
was the individual involved in the car theft with Albert Philips. Under the circumstances
of this case, this brief detainment was no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the follow up investigation to determine the defendant's involvement in the car theft.
Therefore, even if the court finds that the encounter between the defendant and the officer
was a level two stop, the officers had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief detention
of the defendant because they had reliable information that the defendant was involved in
the car theft investigation.
III.

THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST WAS BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD, AMONG SEVERAL OTHERS
WARRANTS STATEWIDE, AN OUTSTANDING WARRANT IN SALT
LAKE CITY FOR HIS ARREST.
The defendant's arrest was based on probable cause because the defendant had,

among several other warrants statewide, an outstanding warrant out of Salt Lake City for
his arrest. A police officer is constitutionally permitted to arrest an individual when there
is a warrant for his arrest. U.R.Cr.P Rule 6. A warrant provides sufficient probable
cause to arrest the individual and extend a seizure.
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[W]hen a warrant for arrest is issued, it is obviously impossible for every
peace officer who might apprehend the accused to have the warrant in his
possession. There is no impropriety in his receiving that information by
any reliable means, including telephone or two-way radio, and thus
serving the warrant.
State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120,121 (Utah 1976).
Under the circumstances of this case, Officer Bieber acted reasonably in arresting
the defendant for his outstanding warrant in Salt Lake City. When the defendant
provided him with his name and date of birth, Officer Bieber ran the information with
dispatch to verify the identity of the defendant. At that time, Officer Bieber was informed
that the defendant had, among several other warrants statewide, an outstanding warrant
for his arrest in Salt Lake City. Officer Bieber reasonably relied upon the information
provided to him in good faith in executing the arrest of the defendant. Therefore, the
seizure of the defendant was lawful based upon probable cause.
IV.

THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT AT THE
JAIL WAS LAWFUL AND VALID.
The search incident to arrest of the defendant at the jail was lawful and valid.

Warrantless searches are not per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. One such recognized exception is a
search incident to a lawful arrest based upon probable cause. United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S.218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); See a]so Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983). "A custodial arrest of a suspect based
upon probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. "An arrested person is not invariably taken to a police station
or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station, that is no more than a
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continuation of the custody inherent in the arrest status." Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645.
"The governmental interests underlying a stationhouse search of the arrestee's
person and possessions may in some circumstances be even greater than those supporting
a search immediately following arrest." Id. At a jail, "it is entirely
proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the
possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed." Id. Furthermore, "examining all
the items removed from the arrestee's person or possession.. .is an entirely reasonable
administrative procedure." Id. See also United v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct.
1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974)("Searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at
the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of
detention."); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983)(Inventory search of the defendant's
belongings at the jail was a lawful search incident to arrest.).
In this case, the defendant was lawfully arrested on an outstanding warrant for his
arrest whereupon Officer Bieber then conducted a protective search of the defendant for
weapons. The defendant was then immediately transported to jail. During the search at
of the defendant at the jail, Deputy Englund discovered a baggy of methamphetamine
in the bottom of a cigarette container in the defendant's pocket. At no time during that
search was Deputy Englund looking for evidence against the defendant. The search of
the defendant was conducted as part of a routine administrative procedure incident to his
arrest. There is no showing that, in conducting the search, Deputy Englund "acted in bad
faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1,10 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (citation omitted). Therefore, the search incident to arrest of the defendant at
the jail was lawful and valid.
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CONCLUSION
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was not seized without a
warrant because the encounter between the defendant and the officers was a level one
encounter. However, even if the court finds that the encounter between the defendant and
the officers was a level two stop, the officer had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief
detention of the defendant because they had information that the defendant was involved
in the car theft investigation. Furthermore, the defendant's arrest was based upon
probable cause because the defendant had, among several other warrants statewide, an
outstanding warrant in Salt Lake City for his arrest. As a result, the search incident to
arrest at the jail of the defendant was lawful and valid. Therefore, the State respectfully
requests that this court deny the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thigpQTday of NOVEMBER, 2002.
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney

f-MYm

'(Gitlfc)

LANA TAYLOR
Deputy District Attorney^
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress was delivered to D. BRUCE OLIVER,
Attorney for the defendant, JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, at 180 South 300 West, Suite
210, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 on t h e j ^ l a y of NOVEMBER, 2002.
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Exhibit "D"
Decision On Motion To Suppress

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
NOTICE

vs .

Case No: 021906404 FS

JOHN EDWARD YOUNG,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

DENNIS M. FUCHS
December 6, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, LANA
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 23, 1964
Video
Tape Number:
video
Tape Count: 10:21
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
HEARING
The above entitled case comes before the court for a Motion to
Suppress.
State's witnesses sworn and excluded.
State calls Officer Ron Vruno - examined. Defense cross examines,
State re-direct. Re-cross.
State calls Officer Jay Bieber - examined. Defense cross
examines. State re-directs.
State calls Deputy England.
(foundation) Defense first examines
Deputy England. State cross examines. Court questions Deputy.
State Rests.
Defense calls John Yound (defendant) sworn and examined. State
cross examines.
Page 1
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Case No: 021906404
Date:
Dec 06, 2002
Defense Rests.
Defense and State argue. Court denies Motion to Suppress. Court
orders state to prepare Findings and Facts. Defense request this be
set for Trial.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 03/03/2003
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS
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faBy'

-V-

Page
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

* * * * *

DUPLICATE

STATE OF UTAH,

ORIGINA L
Plaintiff,

HEARING

Case No.

vs .

-Q1290G10 1

JOHN EDWARD YOUNG,

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Defendant.

NOV I i 2003
*

*

*

*

*

By.

m

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Oeouty ClerK

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 6th day of December,

2002, the Hearing in the above-entitled matter was held

at

the above-entitled

Court,

Salt

Lake Cilrm

ISfV

Utah Court of Appeals

DEC 2 2 2003
This Hearing was electronically recorded,
•pSQWBiSHBa—
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188
dert of the Court

1

Multi-Page
Page 2
A P P E A R A N C E S

For

the

Plaintiff:

MS. TAYLOR
Attorney

For

the Defendant:

at

Law

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney
180 S.
Salt

Judge:

at

Law

3 0 0 W.,

Lake C i t y ,

Suite

210

UT

84101

RANDALL N. SKANKY

•

*

*

*

I N D E X

PAGE
Witness:

Ron Bruno

Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor

5

Cross Examination by Mr. Oliver

17

Re-Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor

27

Re-Cross Examination by Mr. Oliver

31

Witness:

Jay Bieber

Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor

33

Cross Examination by Mr. Oliver

41

Re-Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor

43

DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188

Multi-Page™
Page 3
Witness:

Corbin Robert England
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P R O C E E D I N G S

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

We have the matter of State

of Utah vs. John Young, 021906404, on for a Motion to
Suppress.
MS. TAYLOR:

Yes, Your Honor.

And I apologize

for being late, I was in the middle of a lengthy and
heated sentencing hearing.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

MR. OLIVER:

Which when she got here, Your

Honor, she gleefully said, "Hot dang."
THE COURT:

Are we ready?

MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

We are.
All right.

Let's call the State's

witnesses forward, let's have them sworn in and
excluded.
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
Okay.

If the three of you want to

come forward, we'll have the Clerk swear you in.
COURT CLERK :

Do you affirm the testimony you

shall give in this case to be the truth, theB whole
truth and nothing but the truth, subject to pains and
penalties of perjury'?
SPEAKER:

I do.

SPEAKER:

I do.

1
SPEAKER: I do.
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THE COURT:

All right.

Who would be the first

witness p
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Officer Bruno.
All right.

Officer Bruno, if

you' d stay up there, the other two of you wou Id wait
out in the hall.

I think you know-the drill, you are

free to talk to each other, but nothing invol"ving your
testimony in regards to this case, all right?
MR. TAYLOR:

Yes, Your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MS. TAYLOR:
Q

Officer, please state your full name and

spell your last name for the record.
A

Ron Bruno -- B-R-U-N-O.

Q

Where are you currently employed?

A

Salt Lake City Police Department.

Q

In what capacity?

A

I'm the Detective of the CIT Team, Crisis

Intervention Team, and CIT Coordinator.
Q

And were you employed in that capacity on

May 3rd of this year?
A

I was not.

At that time I was a Detective

for the Pioneer Investigative Unit.
Q
1

And on the day did you conduct an

investigation at 1636 South Pioneer Road?
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A

Yes,

I

did.

Q

What was the nature of your

investigation

that day?
A

The case that I was investigating was a

stolen vehicle case.
Q

And what led you to that address?

A

I was looking for a person by the name of

Albert Phillips.

I was at many different locations the

day prior and all day that day trying to locate this
person.

And as my trail from one place to another was

leading me, it gave me the direction and the
description of a trailer parked at this location behind
the northwest corner of the building.
Q

And what else is located at this address?

A

There's several different automotive shops

throughout this whole place, different companies.

It's

a very large complex.
Q

And were there any other trailers that were

in that area as well?
A

Yes, there was two trailers all together --

trailers -- motorhomes.
Q

And were you able to distinguish between the

one you were looking for and the other one?
A

Actually, I was looking at both.

Q

All right.

And why is that?

DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188
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A

Because I was -- the information that I had

was that they were tied in together, the same people
were livi ng out of both of them.
Q

And when you say trailer, what kind of

trailer are you talking about?
A

It was -- From my recollection, one was a

motorhome and the other one was, I believe, a mini
motorhome •
Q

Okay.

And what did you do -- or what

information were you relying on in going there?
A

Just from what different sources told me,

that Albert Phillips was actually residing there
temporari ly and that the people that were also at that
location were involved in this stealing of vehicles.
It was a very large ring that I was investigating.
Q

When you say ring, what are you talking

about?
A

Stolen vehicle ring, a group of people.

There was a group of people that were identified by the
Division of Motor Vehicles as being involved in
multiple vehicle thefts and fixing the -- doing
different things with vehicles, including what Mr.
Phillip's specialty is, was getting them illegally
re-registered.

1

Q

And how long had you been investigating this
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case?
A

I believe three days.

This exact case was,

I believe, three days, but I knew of this ring and was
involved in different cases with this ring for
approximately a month and a half I believe.
Q

And when you say three days on this

particular case, what case are you talking about?
A

It was a case where a vehicle was taken from

the parking lot of this complex that I went to see.
There was a vehicle that was parked -- that was being
stored at this complex.

The vehicle was towed off the

property, made to run.
The person who I believe -- The suspect, which
I believe was Mr. Phillips, was able to go to the DMV
and get the vehicle -- or get papers claiming that he
lost the title to the vehicle, get the vehicle retitled, sell it to somebody else, and when that person
went down to register it, they were able to register it
in their name.
However, the original owner then discovered it
was stolen, big long circle, found out that it was
stolen, and that's when the vehicle was reported to us.
Through my trail, I was able to put this all together.
Q

All right.

And when you say your trail,

what -- what led up to you responding to this address?
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Well, this is the address of occurrence of

A

the actual theft first off, but there were several -as - MR. OLIVER:

I'm sorry, you said that the

location of the trailers was the location of the theft?
THE WITNESS:

The complex•where the

trailers -- where the trailers -- where I came across
Mr. Young?
MR. OLIVER:
THE WITNESS:

Uh huh.
That was the location of the

original theft of the vehicle that I was actually
investigating.

But at that time -- I mean when I first

got the case, I had no idea that the theft -- that
there was going to be a tie-in to that complex until I
started going out to Magna, went into North Salt Lake,
went into South Salt Lake, West Valley City and started
just talking to different people.

One person would

say, you know, you could probably find them here, you
can probably find them here, I know that he hangs here,
I know that he does this.
Q

(By MS. TAYLOR)

And it was a long search.
So when you finally

arrived, after your investigation, at this address,
what did you do to further your
A
[

investigation?

Basically, I was -- I was under the

impression that Mr. Phillips was staying in one of the
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two -- I call them trailers -- motorhomes, mini
motorhome, so I just picked one, knocked on the door,
Mr. Young answered the door, I identified myself -Well, actually, I identified myself before the door was
opened.

Once he came to the door, I re-identified

myself, asked him if I could speak -to him, and we spoke
for a second.

I asked him his name, identified him.

My partner that was with me, my backup partner that was
with me, just through procedures -- standard
procedures, ran -Q

Let me -- Let me just stop you there.

A

You bet.

Q

Who was with you?

A

Detective Bieber - - or Officer Bieber.

I'm

sorry
MR. OLIVER:
THE WITNESS:
MR. OLIVER:
Q

Officer who?
Bieber.
Bieber.

(By MS. TAYLOR)

And you had taken there as

part of your routine -- what you would do when you go
out to check -A

I'm sorry, what was the first --

Q

Well, I'll ask you the question.

A

Okay.

Q_

You took another Officer why?
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A

For safety.

Q

All right.

A

Yes, it is.

Q

-- procedure?

And is that part of your normal

So you went -- you and

Officer Bieber went to this location and knocked on one
of the two trailers?
A

Yes.

Q

And when you knocked on the trailer door,

who came out?
A

John did.

Mr. Young.

Q

And is that the individual we have pointed

to here •?
A

Yes.

Q

And would he -- did he open the door?

A

Yes.

Q

And did he speak with you from inside the

trailer or outside the trailer?
A

I asked if he would step out and speak to

Q

And did he?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

And what did you say to him?

A

I told him why I was there, that I was

us .

1

invest!gating a stolen vehicle case that I had, and I
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was also looking for a wanted person.

I asked him what

his name was and his date of birth, as standard
procedure to identify the person that I'm

speaking

with.
Also, there was a possibility that he could be
involved in this ring, so I wanted 'to identify the
person.

So it was kind of a two-fold thing, that I was

looking for a wanted person as well as continuing my
investigation.
Q

Let me -- Let me stop you there.

A

Yes.

Q

You stated that you asked him for his name

and date of birth; correct?
A

Correct.

Q

Did you ask him to produce any form of

identification at that point?

19 |

A

I don't recall if I did or not.

Q

Okay.

And did he give you his name and date

of birth?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And at the time that you were

speaking with him, at this point you and he are both
standing outside the trailer; is that right?
A

Correct.

Q

Why did you ask him to step outside?
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A

Just safety precautions.

Q

Can you explain that?

A

If I was going to -- If I was going to enter

into the location, I don't know what's inside, I don't
know if there's weapons or inside the door is a really
confined space.

I would rather have the person come

out into a more open space where both Officers can be
in the open.
Q

I was not sure what I was dealing with.

Okay.

And what happened after Mr. Young

gave you his name and date of birth?
A

I started asking if he knew -- Well, once

he gave me that, as procedure, Officer Bieber ran
warrants -- warrants on the person -- as I continued my
investigation.
Q

And what is -- Okay.

And what does it mean

to run warrants in this case?
A

You -- Using -- Using our radio system, we

go to a channel called service channel, and we give a
dispatcher the name of a person and date of birth, and
they check the statewide warrant system.
Q

And is that done over a radio that you have

on your person?
A

Yes.

Q

So did -- when Officer Bieber was running

this check, did he go anywhere?
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No.

Q

And how long -- do you recall how long in
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this particular case that took?
A

For the warrants check?

Q

Yes.

A

Minutes generally.

Q

As long as 15 minutes?

A

I don't think that it was even that long

I don't think we were --

that we were even discussing the situation with Mr.
Young, if I recall.
Q

Okay.

So Bieber ran a warrants check over

the radio, and what did you do?
A

I continued to -- I continued with my

investigation trying to find if Mr. Young knew Mr.
Phillips, if he knew of his whereabouts, if he saw him
there earlier, any information I could find to locate
Mr. Phillips.
Q

Okay.

A

At that point, he was not able to produce

much information.

Then what happened?

If I recall, he did know -- I

believe that he does know Mr. Phillips and he has seen
Mr. Phillips at the location if I recall correctly, but
he did not have any information as in where he was or
when -- where he lives or anything of that nature.
Officer Bieber then informed me that Mr. Young had
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warrant s, we took him into custody

Once he was taken

into custody, we secured his trail er for him.

I

then - Q

Let me stop you there.

A

Yes.

Q

You said he was taken into custody

What

does that mean?
A

He was actually placed in handcuff s and

placed under arrest for outstandin g warrants.
Q

And was he placed in a vehicle at that

point?
A

Not at that point.

that ve ry moment.
Q

Okay.

Not - - I mean not at

No.
Was he advised that he was under

arrest and not free to leave?
A

Yes, he was advised he was under arrest and

not free to leave, and that he was under arrest for
outstan ding warrants.
Q

All right.

secured his trailer.
A

And then yo u stated that you
How did that come about-?

I told him -- I asked h im if he would like

me to secure his trail er, he said yes, I askeid him
could I enter and get the keys to secure the trailer
for him , he said yes.

I entered, he gave me the exact

locatio n of the keys, as I recall, I entered, located
L
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the keys, came right outside the door and closed the
door.
Q

And when Mr. Young stepped out to speak with

you, was the trailer door open or closed?
A

It was closed.

Q

Okay.

So he stepped out and closed the door

behind him?
A

Oh, I'm sorry, I misunderstood the question.

Q

Do you recall?

A

I cannot recall if it was open or closed.

Q

All right.

A

I believe -- I believe it was opened.

Q

All right.

But that he gave you permission,

so you went in, got the keys and locked the door?
A

Yes.

And now, jogging my memory, I believe

I also retrieved shoes for him.

I do not believe he

had shoes on at the time.
Q

Okay.

And then what did you do with his

A

Gave them -- Put them in his pocket.

keys?

Q
A

.Okay.

What happened then?

At that point, we still have the trailer --

another motor -- mini motorhome right next to it, so I
-- Officer Bieber escorted Mr. Young to the front of
the motorhome, sat him down on the ground for
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protection as I knocked on the side door trying to see
if we could get -- if there was anybody inside that
trailer, continuing my investigation.
Q

And was anybody in the second trailer?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

A

Well, we had received no answer.

Q

All right.

A

At that point, I asked Officer Bieber, since

So then what did you do?

I was getting off shift, I asked Officer Bieber if he
would complete the warrant service of Mr. Young, he
said he ' tfould, I cleared the call and Mr. Young was
taken to j ail.
All right.

Q

And was -- was that the

conclusion of your investigation there at that scene
that day ?
A

Yes .
MS. TAYLOR:

I have no further questions for

this witness.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Cross examination.

CROSS EXAMINATION
By MR. OLIVER:
Q

Well, Detective Bruno, you indicated that

you have been on this investigation for about a month
1

and a ha If; is that correct?
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A

Not the specific investigation that I was

there on and that specific car, but I was aware of
this -- this ring for about a month and a half I
believe.
Q

Okay.

This Albert Phillips, how long had

you been aware of his name?
A

For about a month and a half.

He was on - -

He was one of the people that was listed on a sheet
that inc luded approximately I believe 20 individuals.
Q

Did he have a history of any sort?

A

Yes, he did.

He had a history of stolen

vehicles •
Q

And had he been booked into the Salt Lake

County Jail previously?
A

Yes, he had been.

Q

Did you have booking photos of him?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did you have a driver's license photo of

A

No, I did not.

Q

And so you knew what Albert Phillips looked

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Is that correct?

A

Correct.

him?

like?

1
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Q

At the time that you approached Mr. Young's

trailer, you knew what Mr. Phillips looked like then;
didn't you'P
A

Yes, I did.

Q

So when Mr. Young opened th<B door, you knew

that that was not Albert Phillips?'
A

I knew that was not.

Q

Now, had anybody identified Mr. Young at all

by name in your investigation?
A

Oh, prior to -- prior to me meeting Mr.

Young?
Q

That's correct.

A

No.

Q

And subsequent thereto he's not been

implicated in any way, shape or form in your
investigation of the stolen vehicles?
A

No.

Q

Now, the motorhome, did you check and see

who owned the motorhome before -- either of the
motorhomes before you approached them?
A

No.

Q

Was this -- And I'm

trying to understand --

If you can help me to understand the 1 ayout there, you
say complex.
1

Is it all several shops located on one

piece of property, is there a street in the middle,
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what do you mean when you say complex?
A

No, it's not a street, there are no streets

inside the complex.

If you can imagine a large, fenced

off parcel of property with fences -- with a building
situated nearly in the center of it.

There's entrances

on both sides through the fencing that lead to
different shops or warehouse type places on this
property, and there's approximately I believe two other
outbuildings on this property besides the main one.
Inside the main building it's a bunch of overhead
doors, and some of those doors belong to one shop, some
of those doors belong to another shop, some belong to
another shop, there's a common bathroom area in the
back area of that main building.

The other two

buildings I believe are separate shops owned by -- or
rented by other people.
And this whole complex has numerous vehicles
that are being worked on, stowed -- I mean stored that
have been towed there all along the perimeters and the
inside, there's just numerous vehicles all over.
Q

Okay.

Now, when you knocked on the trailer

-- and I'll call it a trailer -- motorhome or trailer,
whatever it is, and I'll just refer to it as a trailer
if you don't mind.
A

That's fine.
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Q

When you knocked on the trailer that Mr.

Young was in, is that -- have you come at this point to J
understand that that was where he was living?
A

Mr. Phillips?

Q.

Young.

A

Did I -- I'm

Q

Now, you knocked on the trailer that Mr.

sorry?

Young was in?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, have you later come to understand that

that was Mr. Young's trailer?
A

I -- I don't know if that -- if he is the

owner of the trailer.

I know that he was staying

there.
Q

Okay.

He was living there?

A

Okay.

Q

Is that correct?

A

I know that he was staying there.

Q

And when you entered the trailer, did it

look as though he was living in the trailer?
A

It looked like somebody was living there.

Q

Pots and pans, kitchen utensils, whatever

the case may be, the regular accoutrements for home
living; is that correct?

J

A

I would not be able to say.
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be a place that was used for taking breaks from a shop.
There were car parts in there, vehicle parts in there
and that.
Q

Okay.

Now, when Mr. Young opened the door

for you, had he just awoken; do you know?
A

I believe he did.

Q

And when he opened the door, isn't it true

that he opened the door and he didn't have a shirt on?
A

I don't recall.

Q

And he didn't have shoes on; did he?

A

I don't believe he had shoes.

I do not

recall if he had a shirt or not.
Q

And isn't it true that when he opened the

door that you, rather than asking him to step out, that
you reached up and grabbed him and pulled him out of
the trailer?
A

That is not true.

Q

And isn't it true that you then at that

point in time placed him up against a car and frisked
him?
A

That is not true.

Q

Now -- And when you went back into the

trailer, isn't it true that you retrieved from Mr.
Young both shoes and a jacket?
A
I don't recall the jacket.
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that I might have retrieved a jacket.

I do not recall

a jacket.
Q

Do you know who else was living in the home?

A

No, I do not.

Q

Have you ever investigated to find out who

else was living in the home up to this point in time?
A

No, I have not.

Q

But, at any rate, when you encountered Mr.

Young outside the trailer, he wasn't wearing the
jacket; was he?
A

I cannot recall.

Q

If he wasn't wearing shoes, would it seem

reasonable or plausible to you that he was wearing a
jacket as well?
A
wearing.

I -- I am sorry, I do not recall what he was
You just jogged my memory that I had to

retrieve shoes.
Q

Now, after you arrested Mr. Young, did you

search him?
A

I did not.

Q

Did you give him his miranda warning at all?

A

I did not.

Q

At the time that you encountered Mr. Young,

you were sure that he was not Albert Phillips, the
person you were looking for?
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That is correct.

Q

And did you have a warrant for Albert
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Phillips or did you just want to talk to him?
A

Both.

There were warrants -- outstanding

warrants for Mr. Phillips' arrest.

I believe there was

four or five all together.
Q

Related to your investigation or just --

A

No, separate invest -- separate, not related

to my investigation, but then I also wanted to speak to
him about my investigation.
Q

Have you since located Mr. Phillips?

A

I have not.

I did get a flag on him, but I

have not located him.
Q

Do you have a case number on this case that

you were investigating Albert Phillips?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Do you have that number with you today?

A

Yes.

Q

Uh huh.

A

The case number on that would be Salt Lake

May I retrieve it?

City Case No. 2002-75174.
Q

2002-75-17 --

A

I'm sorry, 2002-75174.

Q

174?

A

Yes .
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Q

Now, what did you just pull out, is that the

police report -A

Yes, it is.

Q

-- that you've prepared to this point in

time on that?
A

Yes, it is.
MR. OLIVER:

May I approach the witness, Your

Honor?
THE COURT:

What does it have to do with this

hearing?
MR. OLIVER:

I don't know.

Well, would he

know -- Well, he's testified that he went there, he's
testified that this is the report on that.

I don't

know, there may or may not be information about his
encounter with Mr. Young contained within this report.
THE COURT:

Well, maybe I'm mistaken, I took

that to be the report on the original car theft.
THE WITNESS:
MR. OLIVER:

That is correct.
That's correct.

That's the one

on Albert Phillips when he went to Mr. Young's
residence and located Mr. Young.

I don't know that

there
THE COURT:
mean.

No, that isn't what I took it to

Is it -- In that report do you have reference to

25 I Mr. Young?
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THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

No, I do not.
That's just the original car.
I understand.
There wouldn't be any

(inaudible)

to Mr. Young.
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.

Let me ask -- Let me ask

another question, because -Q

In your report, with regards to Albert

Phillips, did you document this particular aspect of
your investigation of Albert Phillips -A

No, I did not.

Q

- - i n your Albert Phillips report?

A

No, I did not.

Q

Did you document the statements of the

people who led you to this location?
A

No, I did not.

Q

Do you know who they were that told you

about this location?
A

I cannot recall exactly.

I believe -- I

believe it was a service station in West Valley on 3500
South and about 40th West, but I do not recall.
Q

Now, at the time that you encountered Mr.

Young, did you believe that he had violated the law?
A

No.

Q

Did you have reason to believe that he had
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violated the law?
A

No.

Q

You didn' t even know who he was; did you?

A

No.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:

No further questions.
Anyth:Lng on re-direct?
Couple questions.

RE- DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MS. TAYLOR:
Q

You stated that you were aware of other

people that were involved .in this ring; is that
correct?
A

Correct.

Q

Did you have names of all the other people

that were involved?

A

All -MR. OLIVER:

Your Honor, I'm going to ask the

relevanc y of that, but, more than that, I'm going to
indicate that if she pursues it much further, I'll let
it drop very easily, but I will want to see that report
if she's going to go into <anymore of that.

I mean I

let her lay the foun dation as to how she came to Mr.
Young's place.
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.
But if she's going to start
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talking about names of co-defendants in the other case,
I'm going to want to see that police report.
THE COURT:

Well, I mean you can see the

police report, I don't have any objection, but all that
police report is is the original theft of a vehicle.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

I understand:
It doesn't have anything to do

with his investigation.
MR. OLIVER:

And neither do the co-defendants

of Mr. Phillips either.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm going to overrule the

objection, because I think you brought out, when he
went to the trailer, was he looking for other
individuals, and I think that's where Ms. Taylor is
going, and whether she -- I'm going to allow the
question, go on.

And you can do with as you need, but

go on.
Q

(By MS. TAYLOR)

all on the same page.

Let me rephrase it so we're

You stated on cross examination

that you did not have Mr. Young's name come up as part
of your car theft investigation; correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

But you did have information that Mr.

Phillips was not the only one involved; correct?
A

That is correct.
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still -- it's inactive pending contact with Mr.
Phillips •
Q

And has there been an arrest made in the

particul ar case that we have discussed?
A

In my specific case there has not been an

arrest made.
Q

All right.

A

By my agency.
MR. OLIVER:
THE WITNESS:
MR. OLIVER:
THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.
By my agency.
Okay.
There is -- There is possibly a

secondary case going on involving this by the Division
of Motor Vehicles.
Q

(By MS. TAYLOR)

Okay.

So at the time that

you went to the trailer on May 3rd, as well as today,
the investigation is not over; is that right?
A

Correct.

Q

And, going back to what you had been asked

on your direct examination, did you -- the information
you relied on when you went to this trailer was that
Mr. Phillips lived there; is that correct?
A

Has been staying there.

Q

And that there were other individuals

that -- at these two trailers that may also be
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involved?
A

May be involved with stealing of motor

vehicles.
Q

Okay.

A

Not necessarily my specific case.

Q

Okay.

Okay.

And the warrants that were out

for Mr. Phillips, do you recall what those warrants
were for?
A

I know the majority of them were involving

some type of auto theft, joyriding.
Q

Did any of them involve -MR. OLIVER:

Objection.

He's answered the

MS. TAYLOR:

I haven't asked the question.

MR. OLIVER:

Well, it's leading.

question.

THE COURT:
hearing.

Overruled.

This is an evidentiary

Go ahead.

Q

(By MS. TAYLOR)

Did any of them involve any

crimes of violence, the warrants that were The warrants themselves?

A

MS. TAYLOR:

Okay.

Not that I reca 11.

Thank you.

questions.
THE COURT:§

Mr . Oliver?

RE--CROSS EXAMINATION
B ^ MR. OLIVER:
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Q

And prior to going to this residence you

believed that this was where Mr. Phillips was staying;
is that correct?
A

I had inf ormation that stated that he is

staying there.
Q

Did you a ttempt to obtain a warrant to

search for Mr. Phill ips?
A

No, I did not.

Q

Why?

A

Because I did not have probable cause, it

was a tip more or less, so I did it as just level one
knock and talk type of call, which I've done with about
30 other locations p rior to this one.
Q

And if you had seen Mr. Phillips, of course,

you would have arrested him immediately?
A

Immediate iy.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Okay.

No further questions.

Anything?
Nothing further.
All right.

You may step down.

Any reason that this witness can't be excused?
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
J

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Oliver?
No.
You're free to go.
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testify ing.
THE WITNESS :
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Thank you very much.
The State next witness

Okay.

Now, we have Off icer

what is your last name, Bieber?
Bieber.

MR. BIEBER:
THE COURT:

Bieber?
Yes.

MR. BIEBER:
THE COURT:

All right.

ten different ways so far.

We've said it about

But I remind you you ' re

(inaudi ble) to tell the truth here today und er pains
and penalties of per jury.
MR. BIEBER:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MS. TAYLOR:
Q

Please state your full name and s pell your

last name for the record.
A

Jay Bieber -- last name is B-I-E- B-E-]R.

Q

Where are you currently employed?

A

Salt Lake City Police Department.

Q

In what c apacity there?

A

I'm a Patrol Officer.

Q

And were you employed as a Patrol Off icer on

1 May 3rd of this year •p
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A

I was.

Yes.

Q

And did you assist with Officer Bruno's

investi gation at 1636 South Pioneer Road?
A

I did.

Q

What was your involvement there at that

location?
A

Officer Bruno asked me to go out there with

him, he was checking for a possible suspect and further
information on a vehicle ring of some sort that had
been -- a crime ring type of thing that had been
occurring in Salt Lake City.
Q

So what did you do in your assistance with

Officer Bruno?
A

I just -- As he went around, he had

information that the individual he was looking for was
living in a trailer at the rear of the address on
Pioneer Road.

He had gone, had information, was

checkin g the trailers to see if he could identify the
individual that he was looking for.
Q

And what happened at the first trailer?

A

We knocked on it.

Actually, I think it was

more of a motorhome type style, but, anyway, knocked
and we received no response.
Q

So then what?

A_

Officer Bruno went over to another trailer
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and knocked on that door.
Q

Any response there?

A

Yeah.

Mr. -- Mr. Young answered.

Q

Okay.

And when Mr. Young answered the door,

what happened?
A

We identified ourselves as Police Officers,

Officer Bruno inquired further into the information
about the individual he was looking for, we asked for
Mr. Young's name, information for identification
purposes.
Q

And when Officer Bruno was speaking with Mr.

Young, where were they standing, in or outside of the
trailer?
A

We were standing outside the trailer and Mr.

Young was standing inside his trailer.
Q

Okay.

Did Mr. Young come outside his

trailer?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

Okay.

And why did Mr. Young come outside

his trailer?
A

I don't recall.

Q

Okay.

So at some point Mr. Young is outside

the trailer and he's having a discussion with Officer
Bruno; is that correct?
A
Yes .
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Q

And did you -- were you a part of this

discussion with Mr. Young as well?
A

I wasn't directly involved, I didn't have

information about the case in which Officer Bruno was
investigating, and so I was more of just a -- I don't
know -- security type role.

At the' time, after

receiving Mr. Young's information, I was checking him
for warrant information.
Q

Okay.

A

And identification as driver's license or ID

Q

Okay.

card.

information.

You stated that he provided his

What information did he provide?

A

His name and date of birth.

Q

Okay.

And did either -- did you -- did --

was he asked for his -- any form of
A

I don't recall.

identification?

I did end up -- He did not

have -- I did not have a piece of ID that I actually -when I was checking to confirm his driver's license
information, I didn't have a physical driver's license
or piece of identification to cross reference, I just
had his -- what he had told me as his name and date of
birth.
Q

Okay.

And how did you -- how did you run a

check on the information he had told you?
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Yes .

Q

And what did you do when you got to the

A

I walked him into the booking area, placed

40|

jail?

him on the bench seating, went and filled out a booking
information sheet, and then assisted Officer England in
escorting him over to the booking area where he was
searched by Officer -- or, excuse me, Deputy England.
Q

And was he handcuffed this entire time?

A

Yes, he was.

Q

And were you present when Deputy England

performed the search?
A

I was.

Q

Did you perform the search or assist in it?

A

I did not.

No.

Q

All right.

And did Deputy England find

anything while you were watching him search Mr. Young?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

What did he find?

A

He found a small baggy inside a package of

cigarettes that was on Mr. Young's person.
Q

Where on Mr. Young's person was the

cigarette pack found?
A
Q

I don't recall.
All right. And what did Deputy England do
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with the methamphetamine that he found?
A

He let me know that he had found it, he gave

it to me, at that time I performed -- well, based upon
my training experience, I identified it as a controlled
substance and then I field tested it for
methamphetamine.
Q

Okay.

I don't have further questions.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Cross examination, Mr.

Oliver.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By MR. OLIVER:
Q

Well, at what time did Mr. -- or at what

point, excuse me, did Mr. Young come out of his
trailer?
A

Shortly after we had knocked on the door,

identified ourselves and spoken to him for oh, maybe a
minute or two.
Q

And isn't it true that he was assisted out

of the trailer, told to come out?

out

A

I don't recall.

Q

You don't recall?

A

I don't recall.

Q

Now,

of

the

isn't

trailer

it

that

true

that

h e was n o t

coat or s h i r t or shoes?
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I remember him not wearing shoes, because we

ended up putting those on him.

I don't remember any of

the rest of the clothing.
Q*

Don't you remember that there was a coat

that was retrieved for him as well?
A

I don't remember.

Q

Now, when Mr. Young was outside the trailer,

was he free to leave, if he wanted to go back in the
trailer and close the door, could he have done so?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Just walked away from you and closed the

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Did you advise Mr. Young of his

door?

constitutional rights at any time?
A

Any specific constitutional right or just --

Q

Well, miranda?

A

I did not.

Q

Or any other constitutional rights, if you

wish, but I'm asking specifically -A

I di.dn' t advise him of mir anda.

Q

Did you advise him of any other

No

•

constitutional rights?
A

1

Q

None\ that I can think of.

Now, when Mr. Young was pi:Llled out of the
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trailer, isn't it true that he was placed up against
the car and that he was initially just frisked at that
time?
A

Yes, that is correct.

Q

And was anything located on him at that

A

No, nothing was located.

time?

MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

I have no further questions.
Okay.

Anything on re-direct?

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MS. TAYLOR:
Q

By the time that you had received the

information back from dispatch about a warrant, had
Officer Bruno conduct -- or finished with his
investigation?
A

He was still speaking with him about if he

had any further information about the suspect he was
looking for.
MS. TAYLOR:
it.

All right.

And -- Okay.

That's

Thanks.
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else?

Nothing further.
All right.

You can step down.

Any reason this witness can't be excused?
MS. TAYLOR:

No, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you for testifying.

You're free to go.

You may call your next

witness.
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

That would be Deputy England.
Okay.

MR. OLIVER:

And, Your Honor, with regards --

MS. TAYLOR:

I'm sorry, did I miss something?

Well, no.

THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

No.
Okay.
At least not yet.

Is Deputy

England's search part of this, does -MR. OLIVER:

I -- I personally only have one

question.
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.
Other than I was just going to

stipulate that he didn't have to testify, but now I
better ask -- I've got one question.
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.
As far as I'm concerned, he

searched and he found whatever he found, and that's
where we are.

I don't think that's an issue for us.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, why don't you bring

him in.
MR. OLIVER:
But I did have just one question
HFPOMAX REPORTING. TNC (801) 328-1188
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to ask him, so -- If she'll just allow me to ask the
question, I'll stipulate to basically the other thing.
MS. TAYLOR:

I'm

sorry?

MR. OLIVER:

I said if you'll allow me just to

ask one question, I'll stipulate to what the other
Officers have testified to.
MS. TAYLOR:

That would be fine.

THE COURT:
come forward.

All right.

All right.

Deputy, why don't you

Let me remind you that you

are under oath to tell the truth here under pains and
penalties of perjury; right?
MR. ENGLAND:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Why don't you have a seat.

We're

going to do things a little bit out of order, we're
going let defense ask a question and maybe abbreviate
these proceedings.
mind?

Oh, I think you're okay.

Do you

Do you want this Officer out before you ask the

questions?
MS. TAYLOR:

(Inaudible).

MR. OLIVER:

I'm going to ask him a question

that he's already answered.
to have a transcript.

We've got -- We're going

As long as he's bound by his

answer, I have no problem with that.
THE COURT:

Well, wait until he leaves and

then we'll -- Okay.

The prior witness has left the
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courtroom.

Go ahead.

MR. OLIVER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MR. OLIVER:
Q

State your name for the record, please.

A

Corbin Robert England.

Q

And where are you employed?

A

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.
THE COURT:

That's two questions.

MR. OLIVER:

I understand.

This is

foundational.
THE COURT:

Oh, okay.

MR. OLIVER:

I just want to go -- If I don't,

I mean I don't know what to say, so I apologize.
THE COURT:
Q

Go ahead.

(By MR. OLIVER)

Were you so employed on May

3rd of this year, 2002?
A

Yes, I was.

Q

Okay.

I'm just going to give you some --

kind of a leading question here.

Deputy, are you

familiar with the incident that occurred on

2002 at the

jail?
A

Yes, I was.

Q

Okay.

Now, you performed a search on that

occasion on Mr. Young?
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A

Sure did.

Q

And you located something on his clothing or

in his person; is that correct?
A

I did.

Q

What was it and where was it located?

A

White substance that appeared to be

methamphetamine located in his cigarette package.
Q

Where did you find the cigarette package?

A

I believe it was in his pocket of his shirt.

Q

Was it in his shirt or was it in his coat

pocket?
A

Not sure.

Q

You don't recall?

A

No.
MR. OLIVER:

I don't know.

No further questions.

CROSS EXAMINATION
By MS. TAYLOR:
Q

Just a moment.

You found the cigarette pack

in a pocket in -- on the -- whatever it was that he was
wearing r on the top; is that correct?
A

Yes, I did.
MS. TAYLOR:

Okay.

No further questions.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MR. OLIVER:
Q_

The top meaning the top portion of the body
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-- the upper portion of the body, the torso portion of
the body?
A

Exactly.

Q

So it was either a coat or shirt or

something like that?
A

Right.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

No further questions.
All right.

For the Court's

information, do you :remember whether it was on the
outer layer of clothes or an inner layer of clothes?
THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

I don't.

You don't remember?

THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

Okay.

Any followup on what I asked?

MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

No.
You're free to go.

THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

Anything else?

No.

MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

No.

Thanks.

Thanks.

You're excused.

Does the State

have any additional witnesses?
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

1

THE COURT:

I do not, Your Honor.
Okay.

State rested.

We' d call Mr. Young.

Okay.
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COURT CLERK:

Do you swear your testimony you

shall give in this case to be the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth subject to pains and
penalties of perjury?
THE COURT:

All right.

take the stand, please.

Mr. Young, if you'd

Go ahead. .

DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MR. OLIVER:
Q

Mr. Young, drawing your attention to the

date of May 3rd, 2002, do you recall that date?
A

Yeah.

Q

First of all, state your name for the

record, please.
A

John Young.

Q

And do you recall the date of May 3rd, 2002?

A

Yes, sir, I do.

Q

Now, prior to being arrested on that date,

were you aware that there was a warrant outstanding for
your arrest?
A

No, I wasn't.

Q

Tell us what happened from the initial --

begin with the initial encounter with the Police
Officers, tell us what happened.
A

Well, initially I heard someone pounding on

the doors and going around to the windows, because I

DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188

Multi-Page
Page 50
was asleep.

I woke up kind of in a daze wondering

what's going on.

I go to open the door, as I opened

the door, the Officer reaches up and grabs my hand and
pulls me out of the trailer and questions me if I -- my
name and stuff like that.
Q

Let me stop you right there.

How are you

dressed at that time?
A

I have no shoes on, pants and a shirt, and

that's it, I just woke up.
Q

Okay.

And did you come out of the trailer

voluntarily?
A

No.

Q

Did the Officer reach up and pull you out of

the trailer?
A

As I was opening the door, because it's a

latch lock, I was standing like the main level, and
there's like two steps before -- before the door, and
then the door opens and you walk out.

I was like

standing between the two steps to unlatch the door and
hold it open, and he reached in and grabbed my arm and
said, could you step outside and talk to us.
Q

Okay.

Now, let me -- just so I have a clear

picture, I think I understand what you're saying.
We've heard the difference between a motorhome and a
trailer here.

Is this a motorhome or a trailer?

DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188

Multi-Page
Page 5l|
A

Motorhome.

Q

And oftentimes motorhomes may have step down

inside of their walls; is that correct?
A

Yeah.

Q

So you have a main floor and then you have

two steps down and then the outside door; is that
correct?
A

Yeah.

Q

So you were standing inside that two step

A

Yeah.

Q

-- when you unlatched the door and opened

A

Yeah.

Q

Now, you've heard one Officer testify that

down

it?

you were put up against the car and frisked immediately
and another one testify that you were not.

What

happened?
MS. TAYLOR:

Objection, Your Honor.

I heard

no testimony here today that he was ever put up against
a car.
MR. OLIVER:

Well, Officer Bieber testified

that that indeed occurred.
THE COURT:

I think Officer Bieber testified

that he was frisked, but I'll let him describe what he
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-- what his recollection is of what occurred.
THE WITNESS:

2

I was then -- Well, see, there's

3

a lot of cars around the -- where my trailer is parked.

4

As he pointed out, he turned me around, pushed me

5

against -- or away -- away from the -- facing towards

6

the trailer against -- my back against to a car, and he

7

was emptying my pockets and checked, you know, my pants
pockets and everything.

And I guess he ran my name and

stuff and came back and said I had a warrant.
10

MR. OLIVER:

11

THE COURT:

14

Okay.
CROSS EXAMINATION

12
13

No further questions.

By MS. TAYLOR:
Q

Okay.

You stated that one of the Officers

15

pushed you up against a car, you were facing the

16

Officer; right?

17

A

Yeah.

18

Q

And he pushed you up against a car with your

19

back to the car?

20

A

Yeah.

21

Q

And were you handcuffed at this time?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Okay.

24

the --

25

This was right after you came out of

A
Yeah.
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1

Q

-- out of the motorhome?

And how far -- The

bottom St(Bp of the motorhome, how far off the ground is
that?
A

About two feet.

Q

And is there a step, is there something --

A

There -- There's a little box that I placed

there, so you kind of had to -- when you step down you
make a qu ick short step and then to the ground.
Q

Okay.

So there's a step in between the

bottom step of the motorhome and the ground?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

And which -- And then there's

--in

the motorhome there's a couple of steps in there as
well; right?
A

Right.

Q

Uh huh.

A

There -- Yeah, one step and then the floor.

Q

Okay.

A

And it's only a distance of maybe two feet.

Q

Okay.

A

Short steps.

Q

And does the door of the motorhome open out?

A

Yes, it does.

Q

So you're standing on the step in the

Where the floor level is.

And --

1 motorhc>me and you open the door?
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A

Yeah.

Q

You're not on the bottom level, you're on

541

the step up?
A

No, my one foot is on the bottom level --

floor level at the bottom of the door.
Q

Okay.

So you opened the door and what do

you see, two Officers?
A
know.

Yeah, immediately they're right there, you
The hand I had on the door, because you have to

unlatch it to open it, and he reached up and grabbed my
hand and can you step outside, kind of pulled me right
on out the door.
Q

So he pulled you down the next two steps?

A

Yeah, to ground level.

Q

Okay.

A

Yeah, damn near.

Q

Okay.

Did you stumble, did you fall?

And which Officer was it that pulled

you out of the trailer?
A

The first Officer, the older gentleman.

Q

Okay.

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

So Officer Bruno testified first?

And so then they immediately pushed

you up against a car?
A

Yeah, they --

Q
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A

-- basically just flipped me around and

started patting me down and
Q

—

And when they're patting you down, are you

up against the car at this point?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

And --

A

Facing them.

Q

-- which Officer was it that pushed you up

against the car?
A

Basically both of them were right there.

I

mean they didn't per se forcefully, you know, at that
point, they just turned me around and redirected me
towards the back to the car -- so my back was against
the car.
Q

Were you a little surprised at that point?

A

Yeah, I was still in a daze, I was barely

awake.
Q

Did you struggle with the Officers?

A

Not at all.

Q

And the day they came knocking on your door

was May 3rd; right?
A

Yeah.

Q

It was about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon;

right?
A
Yeah.
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Q

And you were asleep before you heard them

knocking?
A

Oh, yeah.

They were knocking against --

were knocking for about ten to fifteen minutes.
Q

So you had -- you were asleep and had a hard

time waking up and got up and answered the door?
A

Yeah, I had just gone to sleep about 45

minutes earlier.
Q

Do you usually go to sleep at 3:15 in the

afternoon?
A

Yeah, when I work all night.

Q

And on this particular day had you used

methamphetamine?
A

Not that -MR. OLIVER:

Objection.

Irrelevant, Your

MS. TAYLOR:

Well, Your Honor, this --

Honor

THE COURT:

Overruled.

MS. TAYLOR:

1

Thank you.

Q

I'm sorry, your answer was not on that day?

A

Not -- Not to my --

Q

Had you used alcohol on that day?

A

No, I don't drink.

Q

Okay.

But to your recollection you don't

remember using that day?
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A

No.

I mean no, I wasn't.

Q

Okay.

A

I didn't do anything, because I had been

work ing all night.
And that's why you were so tired at 3:15 is

Q

because you - - you worked - All night through the afternoon.

A

MS. TAYLOR:
Okay

-- all throughout the night.

I have no further questions.
THE COURT:

Anything on re-direct?

MR. OLIVER:

Nothing.

THE COURT:

All right.

You may step down.

Thank you.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

We'd rest.
Okay.

Defense has rested.

Argument s, submit it?
MR. OLIVER:

Your Honor, I think that what we

have here is we have, like I say, classic Biebers'
case , but it's fairly close.

The circumstances are

that whi le the Officer claims that he's doing a knock
and talk, I think that if the Court will review the
tape of Officer Bieber's testimony, he did indicate
I as ked specifically if they had put him up against a
car and frisked him and he said yes, that they had done

1 that immediately.

That was the question and answer
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that was given.
We have a discrepancy in testimony between the
Officers as far as their recollection, very
discrepancies.

(inaudible)

Based upon what we have, I don't

believe the Officers had the right to remove Mr. Young
from the home, didn't have the right to retain -- to
detain him the way that they had, and even though
Officer Bieber testified that he was free to leave at
any time, I don't believe that that's the case when you
have two Officers present who pull you out of the house
or drag you out of the house and question you.
Certainly, that is important.

But in this particular

case, it's our intention, our belief that the Officers
reached in, grabbed Mr. Young out, he came out without
shoes on.

I don't think he did that voluntarily.

came out without his coat on.

He

He said he has his shirt

and his pants on, but came out without his coat on.
don't think he did that voluntarily.

I

And the

circumstances are that we believe that indeed they had
time to get a warrant if they had probable cause to go
in after Mr. Phillips, they didn't have sufficient
probable cause to get a warrant, they didn't have
sufficient probable cause to be dragging my client out
of the trailer and detaining him at that time.
THE COURT: Thank you.
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MS. TAYLOR :

Just briefly, Your Honor.

I

don't think there's any evidence that he was dragged
out of his trailer.

The evidence appears to be that

they knocked on the door in the course of an
investigation, whic h I think Officers are entitled to
do, Mr. Young opene d the door, and according to Officer
Bruno, he asked himL will you step out and talk to us
for safety -- what he said were safety reasons, wherein
Officer Bieber, he doesn't recall why the Defendant
stepped out.
And, accor ding to Officer Bieber -- Bieber,
the Defendant was f ree to leave at any time.

I don't

think that this is a level two seizure, and any
information that ma y have been in the record about
being up against a car, which I certainly don't recall,
didn't occur until after the Defendant was under
arrest.

The point is that he's arrested on a warrant,

he can be searched incident to arrest.
Moreover, when he's searched at the jail
pursuant to an administrative search and they find
methamphetamine, certainly that's not a violation.

I

think it is a level one encounter.
And even i f it rises to the level -- to the
level of a -- a level two encounter, which would
[ require reasonable suspicion, they are there
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investigating a car theft ring and they believe that
the individuals living in that house are involved.
So they can certainly talk to this person and
ask do you know what's going on.

Certainly, if there's

a detention, it lasts no longer than to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.
The purpose of the stop is to find out about
this other suspect, to find out if this individual is
involved, and the warrants check doesn't take any
longer than to conduct the investigation on the stolen
vehicle.

So I think -- I think the -- the finding of

the methamphetamine certainly was a lawful search.
MR. OLIVER:

Very briefly, Your Honor.

think we do have a level two.

I

And we're not arguing

that there can't be a search incident to arrest.

I

think that Counsel misplaces our position on that.
Our position is they searched him at the
scene, they didn't find anything at the scene, why did
they find it at the jail?
asked.

That's the question that was

That wasn't an issue in this motion, and I

haven't made it an issue in this motion.
I think that once he's arrested I think that
search incident to arrest is appropriate, and I don't
have an issue with that, nor have I taken issue with
that.
However, the method of getting to the point of
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Mr. Young came out on his own.

1

Of course, he's barefooted, without his coat,

2
3

and he just woke up.

So, sure, I -- I can understand

4

that.

5

it.

6

(inaudible) of State vs. Beaver, exactly what we have

7

there.

I don't believe it either, but I can understand
So in this particular case it does fall within the

And in this particular case they don't have

8

reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Young has

9
10

violated the law, they don't have reason to --

11

reasonable belief or reasonable suspicion that there's

12

been a violation of law that occurred that would

13

warrant their involvement or their action, and they

14

turn this rather into a level one contact, they turn it

15

into a level two contact, because they have heard from

16

somebody that they can't even identify, maybe at a

17

service station or a quick stop out at maybe 3500

18

South, maybe 4000 West in West Valley, you know, that's

19

where I think I heard it, I don't know who told me, but

20

that's where it goes.

We'd ask the Court to suppress

21

i

the evidence.

22

[

23

i be more interesting than I thought it would be.

24

!

Oliver, I'm going to deny your motion for the following

25

j

reasons, all right.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Actually, it turned out to
Mr.

I think that the Police Officers
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have aL leg itimate right to conduct an investigation.
I think in the course of that investigation
they have <a legitimate right to conduct knock and talks
or go to p eople's homes to see if fugitives are living
there or p eople that are involved in a crime are living
there.

I don't think they need a search warrant to

just knock and investigate a tip.
I think that's what they did, they went to
this home and they found Mr. Young , they had tips that
not only was Mr. Phillips maybe located there, but
other individuals who might have b een involved in the
crime were located there.

I think they knocked on the

door, I don't think that violates Mr. Young's
individual civil liberties or as a constitutional
violation.

Mr. Young answered the door, they started

asking him some questions.
Now, of course, there's a contention of fact
as to whether Officer Bruno put his arm on Mr. Young or
not in the course of asking him to step outside.

Mr.

Young did not resist that, Mr. Young did not say I
don't want to step outside, I don' t want to talk to
you.

The only information I have is basically that Mr.

Young willingly went outside.
There is also a contention as to whether the
frisking of Mr. Young took place or not at that time.
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To be -- To be honest with you, I think that if Mr.
Young was frisked at that time, that may be a violation
of his civil rights, but I'm not sure that that's a
violat ion that would cause the Court to suppress what
later occurred.
In the norma 1 course of investigation and
random warrants check , they don't know who this
indivi dual is, they're concerned about their safety,
they have information that individuals that live in
this area may be invo Ived in a car theft ring.
I think that 's a legitimate level one part of
police conduct that they can run the warrants check.
They found the warrant for Mr. Young, and I think in
the course of finding the warrant they can obviously
arrest him.
I'm not sure that some of his civil liberties
were - - obviously, once they run the warrants check, it
becomes level two stop, and they arrest him and book
him

—

stop.

(The tape was turned over) - - o r the - - o f

the

Did you want to say something, Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Oh, I'm sorry, are you done?
No, but did you want to say

someth ing?
MS. TAYLOR:

I'm just curious for my own, as

you go along, are you going to request the State zo
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prepare

findings

and conclusions ?

That's up to -- if Mr. Oliver

THE COURT:
wants

them pispared.

Yes.

MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

T H E COURT:

Okay.

MS . TAYLOR:
statement,
the

Then with regard to your

is; the Court

finding factually that -- that

D e f e n d a n t. was frisked as soon as he exited the

trailer?
T H E COURT:
he w a s or not., I'm
so I'm

No.

just saying that that could arise,

not making a factual

e v e n if it di.d occur

found at
violation

that. time.

MR. OLIVER:

in

saying

real ity the drugs weren't

All right.

that

r

And it may be a

that was only if it occurred.
And I just want to indicate that

w e ' v e made

w h e t h e r or not an illegal
suppress

But I'm

of his rights, but it' s not -- I'm not making

f a c t u a l finding

the i s s u e

findLing.

I'm not sure that that's grounds

for s u p p r e s s i o n , b e c a u s e

that

I don' t have any idea whether

there I don't think goes to
f r i s k at that time would

the evidence, but it goes to the

of the t e s t i m o n y

that w a s

credibility

t a k e n , because one says yes,

one says n o .
T H E COURT:
1

jury q u e s t i o n ,

Understood.

okay.
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1

MR. OLIVER:

I understand.

I understand,

I'm

2

just telling you that I don't think -- I think I agree

3

with the Court on that, and that wasn't our argument,

4

our argument -- the reason that was brought out was

5

because of credibility.

6

THE COURT:

And that's what I thought, which

7

is why I mentioned it.

8

may have been violated, and there is a credibility

9

issue, but that credibility issue becomes one for the

10

It becomes an issue and rights

trier of fact.

11

MR. OLIVER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. OLIVER:

Or even an issue of detention.
Right.
Which -- Which may be an issue

14

that goes to the - - t o the intent of the Officers when

15

they contacted him, so for that, but that's where we

16

sit on that.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. OLIVER:

19
20

Okay.
It's not the frisk itself, it's

the indicia of what it represents.
THE COURT:

That's okay, the Court has, you

21

know, made its findings, he then was booked, went to

22

jail and the drugs were found.

23

a question for the trier of fact also, why they weren't

24

found earlier but were found later.

25

becomes an issue for the trier of fact and who they
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decide to believe or not.
But I don't think there's grounds, at least at
this point, to rule that the original

investigation

lacked any probable cause, was a violation of Mr.
Young's rights -- constitutional rights, and,
therefore, his arrest and everything taken after that
should have been suppressed.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Okay.

Do you want me to set the

trial?
MR. OLIVER:

Yeah.

I think that, Your Honor,

at this point in time though I'm going to make a motion
in limine, it's just going to be -- if we need to file
a written one, we'll be happy to, but I'm going to ask
at time of trial we'll stipulate that the Officers
arrested him, and I will not argue that they did not
have cause to arrest -THE COURT:

You don't want to even mention the

previous warrant?
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
And that he was on probation?
That's correct.
Yeah, the Court would grant that,

they can just say -- I mean I think an Officer can
1 always testify in regards to rhe information they
ncDAxaYPFPOPTDJr, rwr fRM ^28-11 R£
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1

received they placed him under arrest.

2

MR. OLIVER:

And I'd have no problem.

3

MS. TAYLOR:

And, Your Honor, the only I guess

4

thing that would change that is if Mr. Young takes the

5

stand at trial and the previous conviction becomes an

6

issue •
I'm talking on direct examination.

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. TAYLOR:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.
If he takes the stand, that's a

10

different issue, and we'11 deal with that if and when

11

it occurs.

12

.Okay.

Let's set it for trial.

MR. OLIVER:

The other thing is that I would

13

just ask that we unif:ormly refer to this either as a

14

trail er or mobile home.

15

it as long as we're consistent and not confusing.

16

THE COURT:

I don' t care which way we do

Hopefully, somebody will have a

17

picture or diagram or something , but, yeah, we can

18

we'll make that -- we'll take care of that.

19

MR. OLIVER:

20

THE COURT:

21

So -I'11 agree to that, but we'll just

make that determination if and when it goes to trial.

22

COURT CLERK:

23

MR. OLIVER:

24

COURT CLERK:

25

MR. OLIVER:

January 22nd at 10:30.
I can't.

I've got a jury --

Twenty-ninth, 30th and 31st
And I - - No, I've got a two
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in leaving the 7th open?

In other words, what

I'm

asking is, and I'm asking this for my own information,
if your trial -- if you have another trial that goes on
the 5th, but then the 7th -- 6th or the 7th is free,
will we then be shifted to that?
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
occur.

No, we wouldn'-t do that to you.
No.
But, most likely, that won't

I mean the one on the 6th is -MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
COURT CLERK:

No, that's okay.
-- it's a big case; isn't it?
Yeah, that -- that's the Dr.

Johns.
THE COURT:

Oh, yeah, that's a three day

trial, that's a -- that's a pornography case, and if it
goes, it will take more than a day, because the jurors
have to watch videos.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

And so that's -- we're -So if it goes, you're bumped.
Okay.
All right.
But if it does-not go -Now, if it doesn't go, then -- if

we -- if we can finish Thursday and you want to do
something else Friday, that's fine with the Court.
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if that doesn't go, nothing else goes, if you want to
start Thursday and do this trial Thursday and Friday,
that's fine with the Court.

I'm blocking out

Wednesday, Thursday and Friday on my calendar.
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.

And I don't need to worry about

Wednesday?
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

No, you do need to worry -Okay.

Well, you keep saying

Thursday and Friday, that's why I just asked that
question.
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

No, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday.
All right.

I don't have a

problem with that.
THE COURT:

So if we finish on Thursday, your

Friday is your own.
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.

No, that's fine.

You kept

saying Thursday, and so that's why I said -THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:

All right.

Then that's my fault.

He actually said Wednesday,

Thursday, Friday.
THE COURT:
difference.

But that's okay, it doesn't make a

But as long as --

MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

I apologize.
It's scheduled to start Wednesday

morning.
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MR. OLIVER:
wanted

t o know

That's

--

Okay.

That's

what

I

then.

THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.
Then w e ' r e

free

whenever

it's

finished?
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

That's

correct.

Is that
That's

it.
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We're
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Thanks.
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